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Christopher Shields
APA Abstract, 1997

Ουσία in Metaphysics vii and viii: a Syntactic Study
Aristotle m oves indifferently betw een syntactically differentiable uses
of 'ουσία' throughout Metaphysics vii and viii: (i) one is free-standing, where
'ουσία is used as a substantive, and readily admits of a plural, 'ουσίαι; (ii) the
other is dependent upon an accompanying genitive for its com pletion, and
admits of a plural only in a parasitic way. It is often thought that his ease of
m ovem ent between these two uses im plicates Aristotle in a kind of
confusion, or indeed, in several kinds of confusion. The questions:
(1) What is the ουσία of x?
and
(2) What is ουσία?
ought to receive different kinds of answers. Taken extensionally, answers to
(1) ought to carve out a class of essences, where non-substances no less than
substances might be thought to have essences; taken in the same way,
answers to (2) should present a list of the successful candidates for
substantiality, where, trivially, nothing in any non-substance category merits
a m ention. Similarly, taken intensionally, answers to (1) should specify the
nature of the ουσία of some thing or things, where this w ill turn out to be the
essence of those things, w ith no immediate restriction on the range of
potential essence bearers (e.g. Socrates is essentially a human being; blue is
essentially a color); taken in this way, though, answers to (2) should specify
the nature or essence only of those things which qualify as members of a
restricted class of entities, those in the category of substance, which includes
Socrates but not blueness.
Scholars have wanted to connect the answers to these questions in a
variety of different ways. More to the point, Aristotle him self evidently
connects the dependent and free-standing uses of 'ουσία in striking ways, in
both M etaphysics vii 6 and 17. The cogency of his doing so depends in part
upon how these distinct uses are conceived by him. By the same token, the
various scholarly proposals about their connection are best assessed against
the backdrop of a fairly neutral survey of the linguistic data of Aristotle’s
m ost concentrated inquiry into ουσία, the m iddle books of the Metaphysics.
A full text version will be posted on my web-site, after 15 December.
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